Leger Construction Company v. Roberts, Inc. : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Leger Construction Company v. Roberts, Inc. :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John L. McCoy; Ryberg, McCoy and Halgren; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
R. Mont McDowell; Roe and Fowler; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Leger Construction Company v. Roberts, Inc., No. 13737.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/54
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP 15 1976 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTJHEHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERTS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Added. 
CASE NO. 13737 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge 
R. Mont McDowell 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
John L. McCoy 
RYBERG, McCOY & HALGREN 
325 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
F I L E D 
JUN -9 1976 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
P a ? e 
PETITION FOR REHEARING. ................ 1 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION . . . 2 
NATURE OF CASE 2 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL. . . .... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT: 
I. The Courtfs Holding, with Respect 
to the Proper Procedure for Filing 
a Verified Memorandum of Costs after 
the Amendment of Findings of Fact, is 
Ambiguous and Should be Clarified to 
Prevent Prejudicial Confusion in the 
District Courts 5 
II. The Courtfs Holding, in Reversing 
the Allowance of Attorney's Fees 
for the Failure of Respondent to 
Include Them in Its Cost Bill, is 
Unduly Harsh and Contrary to the 
Compensatory Purpose of §14-1-8, 
U.C.A., in the Instant Case where 
there is no Dispute Concerning 
the Application of the Statute 
and where the Plaintiff was not 
Prejudiced or Surprised in the 
Award 10 
CONCLUSION 14 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated §14-1-8 2,5,11, 
Utah Code Annotated §14-1-5 3 
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 6,10,13 
Utah Code Annotated §34-27-1 6,10 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RULES CITED 
Rule 52(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure . 
CASES CITED 
Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 
P.2d 926 (1963). .. 
Blain Enterprises v. M-B Super Tire 
Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 192, 499 
P.2d 1294 (1972).... 
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965)... 
Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 353 
(1930) 
Palombi v. D&C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 
452 P.2d 325 (1969)... 
Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 27 Utah 2d 
1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972) 
Tiano v. Elsensohn, 520 P.2d 358 
(Oregon 1974) 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERTS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Added. 
CASE NO. 13737 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Roberts, Inc., defendant and respondent herein, respect-
fully petitions the court for a rehearing on the following 
grounds: 
1. The court's holding, with respect to the proper pro-
cedure for filing a verified memorandum of costs after the 
amendment of findings of fact, is ambiguous and should be clari-
fied to prevent prejudicial confusion in the district courts. 
2. The court's holding, in reversing the allowance of 
attorney's fees for the failure of respondent to include them 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in its cost bill, is unduly harsh and contrary to the com-
pensatory purpose of §14-1-8, U.C.A. in the instant case 
where there was no dispute concerning the application of the 
statute and where the plaintiff was not prejudiced or surprised 
by the award. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment for 
defendant on a counterclaim concerning breach of contract in 
an action tried before the court wherein defendant was 
awarded its attorney*s fees pursuant to statute (§14-1-8, 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The court held that the judgment of the trial court was 
correct and should be affirmed but reversed that judgment 
with respect to the award of attorney's fees to defendant. 
The primary ground upon which the court refused to award de-
fendant its attorney's fees was defendants failure to include 
them in its memorandum of costs. Respondent seeks a rehearing 
to re-examine the court's disposition of the trial court's 
judgment with respect to the award of these attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 9, 1971, appellant (Leger) and respondent 
(Roberts) entered into a contract under which respondent 
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was to perform mechanical and plumbing work on maintenance 
stations at Salt Lake City, and Manila, Utah. In connection 
with this contract appellant, as principal, and United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (USF&G), as surety, executed and 
delivered to the State of Utah a labor and material payment 
bond pursuant to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec-
tion 5, U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). 
Appellant commenced an action against respondent claim-
ing $2,782.00 allegedly due from respondent under the terms 
of the contract, and respondent (1) counterclaimed for 
$14,172.04 owed to it under the contract, plus interest and 
attorney's fees, (2) joined USF&G as an added defendant, and 
(3) claimed $3,249.77 due from appellant on other jobs. The 
district court awarded respondent a joint and several judg-
ment against appellant and its surety on respondent's first 
claim in the sum of $8,494.95, and against the appellant only 
on respondent's second claim for $782.25. This court affirmed 
these portions of the district court's judgment. 
In its answer and counterclaim, respondent made specific 
reference to the provisions of §14-1-5 (Answer, 1[7) and in 
its prayer asked for "a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed 
by the court on its first claim" (Answer, p.3). Appellant's 
reply to the counterclaim specifically admitted paragraph 7 
of the counterclaim and did not deny respondent's prayer for 
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attorneyfs fees. 
At the trial respondent introduced expert testimony as 
to attorney's fees (Tr. 2d day, p«129~134; Tr, 3d day, p.l-
5) and appellant, while fully exercising his right to cross-
examine the witness and examine the documentary evidence/ 
never objected to the relevance or propriety of the testimony. 
Appellant's only objection was with respect to documentation 
supporting the amount of time spent in preparing the litiga-
tion* and this evidence was subsequently produced by responder 
and received in evidence. Thus/ the only controversy concerni 
attorney^ fees centered around the reasonableness of the 
fee and the amount of time expended by the attorneys. (Tr. 
3d day, p.2-5). This controversy was properly resolved by 
the trier of fact in favor of respondent. 
The district court's original judgment was filed on 
March 19/ 1974, and* within the five (5) day period mandated 
by Rule 54(d)(2), U.R.C.P., respondent filed a memorandum of 
costs. The memorandum did not include'attorney's fees because 
they were not awarded in the trial court's memorandum decisioi 
and thus excluded from the original findings and conclusions 
of the court. The trial court's memorandum decision denied 
attorney's fees on the basis that there was no contractual 
provision therefor. The respondent, therefore, had no basis 
to determine the amount of the reasonable fee to be taxed as 
cost at the time the memorandum of cost was filed. 
- A _ 
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On motion respondent requested the court to modify the 
findings and amend the judgment, since the trial court had 
overlooked §14-1-8. After hearing, the court amended its 
judgment and findings to include an award of $2,607.50 to 
respondent as attorney's fees. The fees were assessed pursuant 
to §14-1-8 as a cost of suit to be borne by the losing party. 
Since there had been adequate testimony and cross-examination 
in open court concerning the amount of the fees in question, 
respondent did not file an amended cost bill but relied on 
the findings as sufficient verification of the cost of attorney's 
fees. This court reversed the district court's judgment with 
respect to the award of attorney's fees as inappropriate 
since the fees were not included in respondent's memorandum 
of cost. Respondent now petitions for a rehearing on this 
portion of the court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT'S HOLDING, WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER 
PROCEDURE FOR FILING A VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER 
THE AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS OF FACT, IS AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD 
BE CLARIFIED TO PREVENT PREJUDICIAL CONFUSION IN THE DIS-
TRICT COURTS. 
Even if this court should decline to modify its opinion 
with respect to the award of attorney's fees, it should^clarify 
its opinion so as to avoid confusion and the potential for pre-
judice in future litigation involving §14-1-8 and other such 
- 5 -
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statutes (see e.g. §§38-1-18 and 34-27-1)* 
This court!s opinion states: 
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
with respect to "Costs/1 provides that one claim-
ing them must, "within five days" after judgment, 
serve the other party and file with the court a 
verified memorandum of items. Roberts did not in-
clude any attorney's fees in his cost bill within 
the five-day prescribed period, - and could not 
have done so because the original judgment awarded 
none. He sought the fees nine days after the judg-
ment and four days after the required cost bill 
filing date. The attorney's fees were incorporated 
in the judgment and that is the present state of 
the record. The judgment cannot be amended again 
on motion because it is too late. As a matter of 
fact the judgment for attorney's fees is invalid 
since there was nothing in the contract providing 
for such an award. 
This portion of the court's opinion suggests that unless the 
prevailing party files a complete cost bill within five days 
from the entry of the original judgment, the party waives his 
right to have the court tax additional costs to the losing 
party, even though the prevailing party can move to amend the 
judgment and findings within ten days after they have been 
docketed, and, if approved, these amendments may provide a 
basis for awarding additional costs to the prevailing party. 
The quoted language does not suggest how respondent could have 
preserved its right to the attorney's fees when the fees 
were neither assessed nor included in the court's findings 
until after the five-day period for filing a cost bill had 
lapsed. When statutory attorney's fees were awarded in the 
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district court's judgment, the court was merely reiterating 
the assessment of the fee which was stated in the amended 
findings, for, as this court has stated, unless the parties 
otherwise agree the district court must take evidence on the 
issue of reasonable attorney's fees and must make findings 
thereon. Blain Enterprises v. M-B Super Tire Market, Inc., 
28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P.2d 1294' (1972); Provo City Corp. v. 
Cropper, 27 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972); F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). 
As this court correctly noted, the district court could not 
award attorney's fees as part of the judgment absent a con-
tractual agreement, but it could and did assess the amount 
of the fee which it included in the findings. 
Under current practice, the "reasonableness" of an award 
of attorney's fees is always a question of fact which demands 
a finding from the trier of fact in light of the novelty of 
the case, the time devoted to preparation, and the relative 
skill of the attorney. Evidence customarily is introduced at 
trial with respect to this question and the appropriate award 
is included in the verdict or the findings. The appropriate 
amount can then be incorporated into the prevailing party's 
memorandum of costs. A party cannot file a memorandum of 
costs until those costs are determined, yet this court's 
- 7 -
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opinion seems to penalize the respondent for failing to do 
something he could not do at the time required. 
Theoretically there should be no need to file a cost 
bill with respect to costs which have been determined through 
testimony at trial* The purpose of a verified cost bill is 
t o
 avoid a needless expenditure of court time with respect 
to matters which are easily documented and about which there 
is seldom any dispute. (e.g. filing fees, costs of service 
complaints, subpoenas, witness fees, etc.). The verified 
memorandum provides the losing party with an opportunity to 
have the items of cost presented under oath and subjected to 
challenge. But, when testimony concerning attorney's fees is 
presented in court, the opposing party may exercise his right 
to cross-examine or object and thereby challenge the proposed 
assessment. Is any valid purpose satisifed by including the 
fees in a cost bill when testimony concerning them has already 
been presented? Such a procedure could only spawn confusion, 
duplication, and additional controversy.-
If this court's holding remains the law, a prevailing 
party will lose his statutory right to an attorney's fee, if, 
through inadvertence, the amount of the fee is omitted from 
the findings and those findings are not amended until -after 
the five-day period for filing a cost bill has lapsed. Appare 
ly, this would be true even though there was adequate testimor 
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at trial concerning the reasonableness of the fee, neither 
party was in any way surprised or prejudiced by the courtfs 
determination and the fees were eventually included in 
amended findings. It is unlikely that this court intends 
such a harsh result for such an unavoidable omission. 
To avoid this dilemma, future litigants will be required 
to include their attorney's fees in their initial cost bill 
whether or not such fees are included in the findings and 
whether or not there previously has been testimony concerning 
the reasonableness of the fee. The predictable results of 
this procedure will be two-fold: First, litigants will be 
encouraged to avoid placing testimony in evidence at the 
trial concerning statutory attorneyfs fees and will instead 
merely itemize them in their memorandum of costs; and, 
second, the cost bill will become a major source of contention 
initiating objections and motions for the court to tax costs 
with the inevitable prolongation of litigation and the nec-
essity for post-trial hearings to resolve matters which could 
be more economically disposed of at trial. Moreover, this 
procedure would be inconsistent with this court's prior de-
cisions, supra, which require testimony as to reasonable 
attorney's fees be presented at trial. 
Respondent urges this court to reconsider the policies 
- 9 -
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and purposes underlying the timely application of a verified 
memorandum of costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) and to adopt a 
holding which more closely conforms to these policies. In 
the interest of clarity and practicality, respondent suggests 
that the court amend its holding by either (a) expressly 
permitting a party to file an amended memorandum of costs 
within five (5) days after amended findings have been filed 
whenever the amended findings affect the taxing of costs, or 
(b) expressly declining to require a memorandum of costs with 
respect to those items of cost upon which there has been open 
testimony and written findings. In these latter cases the 
findings can stand as a superior substitute for the memorandum 
of costs. Respondent believes that these suggestions will 
clarify the intent of the court's holding and will serve 
to better advance the purposes of the cost bill procedure. 
Since attorneyBs fees are statutorily taxed as costs in 
areas other than suits on bonds (see e.g., mechanics liens 
§38-1-18, and suits for wages §34-27-1), the instant decision 
provides an appropriate opportunity for the court to announce 
the proper procedure and policy to be followed in these cases. 
II :" 
THE COURT'S HOLDING, IN REVERSING THE ALLOWANCE 0F~ 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO INCLUDE 
THEM IN ITS COST BILL, IS UNDULY HARSH AND CONTRARY TO THE 
COMPENSATORY PURPOSE OF §14-1-8, U.C.A., IN THE INSTANT CASE 
WHERE THERE IS NO DISPUTE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTE AND WHERE THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICED OR SUR-
PRISED IN THE AWARD. 
- 10 -
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Respondent sought and was awarded attorney's fees 
pursuant to §14-1-8, U.C.A., since the action was brought, 
in part, on a payment bond and since Roberts was the pre-
vailing party in the action. The appellant had adequate 
notice of respondent's demand for attorney's fees since this 
request was included in the prayer of respondent's counter-
claim. In Tiano v. Elsensohn, 520 P.2d 358 Ore. (1974) where 
the losing party objected to the award of statutory attorney's 
fees for the prevailing party's failure to plead them 
specifically, the court held: 
Because attorney's fees are part of costs, it 
is unnecessary for plaintiff to make any more 
mention of them in his complaint than he would 
have to make concerning other items of costs. 
They need only be requested in the prayer. 
In the immediate case, respondent not only requested attorney's 
fees in its prayer, but introduced testimony at trial con-
cerning the reasonableness of the fee. Appellant has never 
disputed the applicability of this statute* Nevertheless, 
respondent must bear the costs of its attorney's fees from 
the amount of the contract price awarded in the judgment 
because of its failure to itemize the fee in its cost bill* 
This court's opinion mandates this result even though the 
amount of the fee was verified by testimony in court. -
An award of costs to the prevailing party is intended 
- 11 -
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to "reimburse" the successful party for the expenses in-
curred in presenting or defending an action or special pro-
ceeding and is merely incidental to the judgment in the 
actione Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 353 (1930)• 
The award of a reasonable attorney's fee as a cost of liti-
gation differs from the award of other costs since the 
amount of the cost is not prescribed by statute. Thusf while 
most litigation with respect to statutory costs focuses on 
the items of cost, controversy over attorney's fees usually 
centers on the amount of the "reasonable" fee and testimony 
and findings are inevitably required before attorney's fees 
can be taxed as costs. Blain Enterprises v. M-B Super Tire 
Market, Inc., supra. 
The procedure prescribed by Rule 54(d) (2), U.R.C.P., is 
designed to avoid the introduction of evidence with respect 
to those items of cost which are clearly provided by statute, 
and, a verified memorandum of costs is generally sufficient 
evidence of the actual costs incurred without the need to 
prove costs in court. The purpose of the cost bill, there-
fore, is to test the veracity of the author and its contents 
which purport to express a true itemization of costs. Barton 
v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 P.2d 926 (1963). When, however, 
the parties have subjected their veracity to the rigors of 
- 12 -
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the witness stand and to cross-examination/ additional item-
ization in a verified memorandum of costs does not advance 
the purposes for Rule 54(d) (2) but in fact thwarts them* 
The procedure which will be required as a result of this 
court's decision will prove to be unduly burdensome and a 
trap for the unwary. 
As this court recognized in Palombi v. D&C Builders, 
22 Utah 2d 297f 452 P.2d 325 (1969), the policy of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is one of "liberality" to se-
cure a "just . . . determination of every action." In that 
case, this court permitted the prevailing party to recover 
attorney's fees pursuant to §38-1-18, U.C.A., even though 
the fees were not specifically requested in the pleadings* 
In the instant case, respondent urges this court to exercise 
its equitable power and award attorney's fees even though 
such were not included in the memorandum of costs because 
the policy of Rule 54(d)(2) was fully complied with without 
any surprise or prejudice to the appellant. In the alterna-
tive, respondent requests permission from this court to 
amend its memorandum of costs so that the attorney's fees 
may properly be included therein. Respondent seeks this 
relief so that the compensatory purpose of §14-1-8 may ~ 
not be hampered by inadvertence or technical error. 
- 13 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that for the foregoing 
reasons the court should reconsider the opinion heretofore 
rendered herein and affirm the trial court's award of attor-
ney's fees to the respondent. 
DATED this 9th day of June, 1976* 
Respectfully submitted, 
R« Mont McDowell 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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